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THE MYTHIC DIFFICULTY IN PROVING 
A NEGATIVE 
Kevin W Saunders· 
An oft-cited propoSItiOn holds that there is inherent diffi-
culty in proving negative averments. 1 Despite consistent schol-
arly attempts to refute this myth,2 judicial reasoning continues to 
refer to this supposed difficulty to justify a "shift" in evidentiary 
burdens. 3 
* M.S .• M.A., Ph.D., University of Miami; J.D., University of Michigan; Law 
Clerk to Hon. Kenneth W. Starr, Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. 
1 See, e.g., Walker v. Carpenter, 144 N.C. 674, 676, 57 S.E. 461, 461 (1907) 
("The first rule laid down in the books on evidence is to the effect that the issue 
must be proved by the party who states an affirmative, not by the party who states a 
negative."), cited with disapproval in MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVI-
DENCE § 337 n.15 (E. Cleary ed. 1984). The Walker court may have been alluding to 
certain early English texts on evidence. See, e.g., G. GILBERT, THE LAw OF EVIDENCE 
104-05 (Dublin 1754). The simplicity of Sir Gilbert's reasoning is seductive: 
And here it is first to be considered [when analyzing proofs], that in all 
Courts of Justice the Affirmative ought to be proved, for it is sufficient 
barely to deny what is affirmed until the contrary be proved, for Words 
are but the Expressions of Facts, and therefore when nothing is said to 
be done, nothing can be said to be proved; and this is a Rule both in the 
Common and Civil Law. The Civil Law says Probatio imponitur ei qui alle-
gat, negantis autem per rerum naturam nulla est probatio. 
Id. at 4. The Walker/Gilbert reasoning is by no means a curiosity of legal history. 
See, e.g., In re Rogers, 297 N.C. 48,57,253 S.E.2d 912, 919 (1979) ("The rationale 
for this rule [that the party who asserts an affirmative be required to bear the bur-
den of proof on it] lies in the inherent difficulty of providing the negative of any 
proposition. "); see also infra note 3. 
2 See, e.g., W. BEST, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE § 255 (London 
1849) (,,[P]roof of a negative may often very reasonably be required when the qual-
ifying circumstances are the direct matters in issue .... "); P. TAYLOR, A TREATISE 
ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 364 (1887) (arguing that allocation of burden of proof 
to party asserting affirmative has been adopted as rule of convenience, and "not 
because it is impossible to prove a negative"); see also MCCORMICK, supra note I, 
§ 337 (labeling the rule as erroneous). 
According to Best, the beliefthat a burden should shift from a party asserting a 
negative to the opposing party because of the supposed difficulty of proof is actu-
ally a misapplication of the Roman Code dictum that the burden of proof lies gen-
erally on the party asserting the affirmative. W. BEST, supra, § 255. See supra note I 
for a handy example of this type of misapplication. 
3 The proposition that negative averments are inherently difficult to prove has 
been applied in a variety of recent cases. See, e.g., Bumble Bee Seafoods v. Director, 
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Dep't of Labor, 629 
F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1980) (availability of job opportunities); United States v. Wylie, 
625 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1980) (adequacy of government denial of electronic sur-
veillance); Carson v. United States, 560 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1977) (assessment of 
wagering excise tax); Slicer v. Quigley, 180 Conn. 252,429 A.2d 855 (1980) (negli-
276 
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This article will demonstrate why the folklore is incorrect. 
There is no special difficulty in proving a negative. There are 
statements whose logical form leads to difficulty in proof, but the 
difficulty arises not from the presence of a negative, but rather 
from a separate, though sometimes related, logical property. 
Emphasizing that other property will do more than exorcise the 
logical fallacies in the legal folklore. It will reconcile the differing 
treatments found in the case law and provide guidance for future 
decisions. 
The first section of this article examines certain logical 
properties of propositions and identifies the property that leads 
to difficulty in proof. It also discusses why the difficulty has been 
attributed to the mere presence of a negative. Section Two ex-
amines several cases that have reached various conclusions re-
garding the degree of difficulty in proving a negative proposition, 
and how that difficulty should affect the proceeding. This article 
will illustrate how the varying conclusions reached by the courts 
may be reconciled through proper use of the relevant logical 
properties. 
I. LOGICAL FORM AND DIFFICULTY OF PROOF 
It is clear that for certain pairs of an affirmative statement 
and its negation the difficulties in proving the components are 
the same.4 For example, of the pair: 
(1) January 9, 1947 fell on a Tuesday. 
gence in failing to control minor's operation of a motor vehicle); In re L.A.C., 407 
A.2d 688 (D.C. App. Ct. 1979) (sexual assault); Van Hoozer v. Farmers Ins. Ex-
change, 219 Kan. 595, 549 P.2d 1354 (1976) (uninsured motorist); Church of 
Scientology v. Minnesota State Medical Assoc., 264 N.W.2d 152 (Minn. 1978) (def-
amation); McFarland v. Skaggs Co., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984) (proof of malice). 
4 "Proof' and "prove" are variously defined. When concerned only with for-
mal validity, we may be quite content with a definition such as "A proof (in L) of A 
is a deduction (in L) of A from no premises except the axioms (of L), if any." S. 
HAACK, PHILOSOPHY OF LOGICS 250 (1978); see also I. COPI, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 
311 (5th ed. 1978) ("We define a formal proof that a given argument is valid to be a 
sequence of statements each of which is either a premise of that argument or fol-
lows from preceding statements of the sequence by an elementary valid argument, 
and the last statement in the sequence is the conclusion of the argument whose 
validity is being proved.") (emphasis in original). Formal validity does not guaran-
tee the truth of the conclusion but merely that it follows from the premises, which 
mayor may not be true. 
Legal proof, however, entails a broader and frequently less formal use of 
"premises" (including evidence) to establish the truth of a proposition. Proof at 
law "comprehends everything that may be adduced at trial ... for the purpose of 
producing conviction in the mind of judge or jury, aside from mere argument." 
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1094 (5th ed. 1979). Although legal conclusions are not 
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and 
(2) January 9,1947 did not fall on a Tuesday. 
neither proposition is more difficult to prove than the other. 5 In 
fact, the methods of proof would be identical. A calendar for 1947 
could be consulted or, if the calendar were unavailable, weeks and 
days from a known date could be counted. Certainly there are 
more, or less, difficult methods of proof, but there is no reason why 
the proof of ( 1) would require a different method of proof than that 
of (2), or why the application of the method should be more difficult 
for one than the other. 
and 
Similarly, of the pair: 
(3) The plaintiff is sane. 
(4) The plaintiff is not sane.6 
neither is the more difficult to prove. That is not to say that the 
proof of either one, given the available evidence in a particular case, 
is never more difficult than the other, but that the existence of a neg-
ative does not categorically make (4) more difficult to prove than 
(3). 
Negative statements may, at times, be more difficult to prove 
than their affirmatives, but this is not an inevitable consequence of 
negative form. Consider the pair: 
and 
(5) There was a Hattiesburg policeman in the Kress store 
when Ms. Adickes entered the store on August 14, 1984. 
(6) There was not a Hattiesburg policeman in the Kress store 
when Ms. Adickes entered the store on August 14, 1984.7 
bound by the same constraints as in formal, logical proof, there is a greater con-
cern, at law, that the conclusions themselves be true. 
Although this article is concerned with problems of the less formal proof used 
at law, certain parallel difficulties in formal proof will be briefly discussed in the 
footnotes. 
5 Of course, one statement of the pair is true and the other false. If "proof' is a 
showing that a statement is true, the proof of one of the statements is impossible. 
If "proof' is a showing that a statement is true or that it is false, each is provable 
with equal difficulty. In any case, any greater difficulty in proving one of the two 
results not from the affirmative or negative logical form of the statement but from 
the contingent truth or falsity of the fact in question. 
6 See, e.g., Daniels v. Superintendent, 34 Md. App. 173, 366 A.2d 1064 (1976). 
7 See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). In Adickes, the Court 
imposed the burden of proof on the party having to prove the negative averment. 
See id. at 154-55. That party had the more difficult burden under the analysis to be 
explicated here. However, the issue arose in a summary judgment context, see id., 
where the burden of proof is on the movant, even as to issues on which the other 
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Here, the statement in negative form appears to be' more diffi-
cult to prove. To prove (5) one need only produce the policeman. 
To prove (6), however, one may have to establish the whereabouts, 
at the relevant time, of every policeman on the Hattiesburg force. 8 
When the propositions of an affirmative-negative pair are not 
equal in difficulty as to proof, it is not always the negative that is the 
more difficult. For example, of the pair: 
(7) Every available job is beyond the capability of the plaintiff. 
and 
(8) Not every available job is beyond the capability of the 
p lain tiff. 9 
the affirmative statement would be more difficult to prove. State-
ment (8) may be proved by finding a single job that is not beyond 
the plaintiff's capability. Proof of statement (7), however, would re-
quire an evaluation of every available job to be sure that each one is 
beyond the plaintiff's capability. \0 
Clearly, the claim that a negative is always more difficult to 
prove is overly broad, yet it persists in legal proceedings. The first 
step in correcting this fallacy is to distinguish the evidential difficul-
ties of statements not by their affirmative or negative posture, but by 
an alternative characteristic called quantification. 11 Statements (1), 
(2), (3), and (4) are examples of unquantified statements of propos i-
party would bear the burden at trial. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors 
Corp., 518 F.2d 420, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
To be precise, the allocation referred to in this paper and in the case law as the 
"burden of proof" is generally treated as a "shift" in the intermediate burden of 
producing evidence rather than in the ultimate burden of persuasion. See, e.g., G. LILLY, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 15 (1978); MCCORMICK, supra note I, 
§ 337. 
8 There may be a means of proof other than showing the whereabouts of each 
Hattiesburg police officer, but any such method must have the effect of demonstrat-
ing that each officer was not in the store. 
9 See Barrett v. Otis Elevator Co., 431 Pa. 446, 246 A.2d 668 (1968). 
10 As with statement (6), there may be other methods of proof, but any such 
method would have to show the unsuitability of each job. 
11 Quantification results in general rather than singular propositions. For exam-
ple, the propositions "footnote 12 of this article is boring" and "footnote 13 of this 
article is worth reading" refer to specific footnotes; they are singular propositions. 
On the other hand, the propositions "all law review footnotes are boring" and 
"some law review footnotes are worth reading" are general because they do not 
refer to any specific individual (i.e., specific law review footnote(s». The first gen-
eral proposition may be expressed as "given any law review footnote, it is boring." 
"Given any x" or "for any x" is called the universal quantifier. The second general 
proposition may be quantified as "there is (or there exists) at least one law review 
footnote which is worth reading." "There is" or "there exists" is called the existen-
tial quantifier. See I. COPI, supra note 4, at 340-46; S. HAACK, supra note 4, at 38-40. 
Quantification theory has recently (and most dramatically) been applied to con-
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tionallogic,12 while statements (5), (6), (7), and (8) are examples of 
quantified statements of predicate logic. 13 
Propositional logic analyzes statements about individual enti-
ties. An individual, the subject of the propositions, is said either to 
have or not have a particular property. There is nothing inherently 
more difficult in proving a proposition stating that an individual 
does not have a property than one stating that the individual does 
have the same property.14 In each case the individual must simply 
be examined to see if the property exists. 15 
Predicate logic el1ioys a wider range of application than pro-
positional logic. It may be employed to analyze statements that at-
tribute a property to unspecified individuals. The statements of 
predicate logic, like those of propositional logic, may be categorized 
as affirmative or negative. A more pertinent division for the pur-
pose of this article is according to the type of quantification em-
ployed. Statements of predicate logic propose either that some 
individual has a particular property, or that every individual in the 
universe of discourse has some particular property. 16 The first sort 
are referred to as existential propositions.1 7 Examples include the 
following: 
struct an ontological defense of language's ability to express particular truths. See 
D. DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 38-46, 210-14 (1984). 
12 Propositional logic is a formal system in which the only elements are variables 
that stand for propositions and connective~. Since there are only propositional 
variables and no individual variables, the logic is inadequate for the analysis of 
quantified propositions. 
13 Predicate logic contains the elements of propositional logic plus individual 
variables and quantifiers-"there is" and "for any "-operating on the variables. 
Predicate logic may be used to analyze arguments involving quantified proposi-
tions. 
Some proofs within predicate logic will involve a combination of quantified 
and un quantified propositions. For example, "all men are mortal. Socrates is a 
man. Therefore, there exists a mortal," involves an unquantified premise, but 
proof of its validity requires predicate logic techniques. 
14 But see supra note 5. 
15 There may, of course, be other methods of proof. For example, a property 
known to be correlated to the property in question may be examined. Whatever 
method is employed, proof of the affirmative should be no more difficult than proof 
of the negative. 
16 Statements such as "there are at least two individuals that have the property 
P" are also predicate logic statements and are existential in form. The example 
may be rephrased as "there exists X and there exists Y such that X is not Y and X 
has property P and Y has property P." Multiplace predicates or relations may also 
be of interest, e.g., "for any integers X and Y, X is greater than or equal to Y or Y is 
greater than or equal to X." 
I 7 See supra note II. 
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and 
(9) There is a cause of action for a violation of cOl)stitutional 
rights by a state official. 
(10) For some injuries caused by the state there is no remedy. 
(11) Some discriminatory practices violate Federal law. 
281 
Statement (5) is also an existential proposition, more clearly seen 
when rewritten as follows: 
(5') There exists some person such that that person is a Hat-
tiesburg policeman and that person was in the Kress store 
when Ms. Adickes entered on August 14, 1984. 
Statements that attribute a property to every individual in a defined 
universe are referred to as universal propositions. 18 Examples In-
clude the following: 
and 
(13) Any criminal defendant has the right to confroln the wit-
ness against him. 
(14) All breach of contract actions must be brought within 
three years of the breach. 
Statement (7)-"Every available job is beyond the capability of the 
plaintiff'-is also an example of a universal proposition. 
Universal propositions are generally more difficult to prove 
than existential ones. 19 To prove an existential proposition one 
need only exhibit the individual possessing the property in ques-
tion.20 To prove a universal statement one must examine every in-
dividual in the universe of discourse to determine whether that 
individual has the property.21 The difference in the difficulty of 
proving universals rather than existentials depends on the number 
of individuals in the universe of discourse. If there is only one indi-
vidual, there is no difference in difficulty, and for a small number the 
18 See id. 
19 The existential quantification of "A has property P" to "there is an X such 
that X has property P" is a rather simple translation, whereas the universal quantifi-
cation of "A has property P" to "each X has property" requires a tracking of how 
"A has property P" was derived. See, e.g., G. MASSEY, UNDERSTANDING SYMBOLIC 
LOGIC 278, 285 (1970) (explicating the Rule of Existential Generalization and the 
Rule of Universal Generalization). 
20 It may, at times, be easier to prove existentials by conclusive evidence rather 
than through exhibition. For example, the statement "[t]here are at least two per-
sons in New York City who have the same number of hairs on their heads" might be 
proved through the counting of hairs. However, logical proof from the premise 
that no one has as many hairs on her head as there are people in New York City is 
considerably less difficult. See M. COHEN & E. NAGEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 
5-6 (1962). 
21 Universals may, of course, be proved by logical means, but again the logical 
proof of a universal is more restricted than the proof of an existential. 
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burden of proving the universal is not much greater than proving 
the existential averment. As the universe of discourse grows, how-
ever, the difference in the difficulty of proof increases. For a very 
large universe, the difficulty may be insurmountable.22 
If it is, in fact, universals that are difficult to prove, why does the 
belief persist that the difficulty is in proving negatives? The answer 
may be found through examination of claims that must be proven in 
litigation and of the logical relations among universal, existential, 
and negative propositions. 
Goals in litigation generally focus on establishing existential, 
rather than universal propositions.23 With respect to statement (5), 
for instance, the fact finder must determine whether there was a 
Hattiesburg policeman in the store, not whether every policeman 
was in the store.24 Similarly, litigation concerning statements (7) 
and (8) would focus on whether there is some job that the plaintiff 
claiming disability can do rather than whether every job is one that 
the plaintiff can do.25 
If an existential proposition supports a party's position, the 
negative of that proposition would be supportive of the opposing 
side. However, the negative of an existential is a universa1.26 
Hence, in many legal cases proving the negative would be proving a 
universal and would indeed be more difficult. 
The position of this article, that the difficulty is in proving a 
universal rather than in proving a negative, is more than an argu-
ment for linguistic accuracy. It must be remembered that not all 
cases turn on the establishment of an existential. The averment in 
dispute may be un quantified, 27 or resolution of the case may depend 
22 For large numbers, one may intuitively resort to induction. However, the 
inferences of induction lack the logical certainty of traditional, deductive logic. See 
Black, Induction, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 169, 170-79 (P. Edwards ed. 
1967); see also S. HAACK, supra note 4, at 17 ("[T]here is no formal system of induc-
tive logic which has anything approaching the kind of entrenchment that classical 
deductive logic e~oys."). Some philosophers have even exempted induction from 
the subject of logic. See, e.g., W. KNEALE & M. KNEALE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOGIC 
701 (1978). 
23 If one party is attempting to prove an existential, the opposing party will be 
attempting to prove its opposite-a universal. 
Consideration of the burden of proof under either the affirmative/negative 
case law distinction or of the logical rule argued here and the pleading require-
ments for a prima facie case most often focus on the existential. 
24 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
25 See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Stoner, 109 F.2d 874 (8th Cir. 1940). 
26 If it is not true that there is an X such that X has property, P, then it must be 
true that every X dos not have property, P. See I. COPI, supra note 4, at 345-46. 
27 See, e.g., Snyder v. Wessner, 55 F. Supp. 971 (D. Minn. 1944); infra text accom-
panying notes 49-51. 
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upon establishing a universa1.28 In the former instance, a party at-
tempting to establish the negative would face no more difficulty be-
cause of its logical form than would the party attempting to establish 
the affirmative. If a universal is in dispute, the negative would be 
easier toestablish.29 A recognition by courts of where the difficulty 
of proof actually resides would help prevent the granting of legally 
(and logically) impermissible concessions to parties facing the sup-
posed difficulties of proving a negative. 
A further benefit is derived by recognizing the actual source of 
difficulty. Commentators have observed that whether a party will be 
required to prove a negative may depend solely on how that party's 
pleadings are worded.30 Since every affirmative is equivalent to 
some negative, it is unreasonable that a burden of proof should 
"shift" or be reduced solely because of artful pleading. There is 
not, however, a similar equivalence between universals and existen-
tials.31 The evidentiary burdens imposed by the universal are deter-
mined by the nature of the action, not because of skillfully worded 
pleadings.32 
II. RECONCILING THE CASE LAw 
Once it is recognized that the difficulty generally attributed 
to proving negatives is in fact the difficulty of proving universally 
quantified statements, it is possible to examine the case law from 
a logically consistent perspective. Not all opinions have adhered 
to unqualified acceptance of the supposed difficulty of proving 
negatives,33 though nearly all have cited the statement as true. 34 
28 But see supra note 23. 
29 Just as the negation of an existential is a universal, the negation of a universal 
is an existential. See I. COPI, supra note 4, at 345-46. Hence, the party proving the 
negative of the universal would face the easier task. 
30 See 1 JONES ON EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 5.8 (S. Card ed. Supp. 1984) 
("Allowing the presence of a negatively phrased averment to shift the burden un-
duly emphasizes what is really a matter of form under the loose idea that a party is 
not required [to prove] a negative averment."); 9 WIGMORE § 2486, at 288 n.3 o. 
Chadbourn ed. 1981} (" The burden [of proof] is on the party having the affirma-
tive [or] that a party is not required to prove a negative ... is not more than a play 
on words, since practically any proposition may be stated in either affirmative or 
negative form.' ") (citation omitted); see also MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 786 (ac-
ceptance of a negation-based rule in allocating burdens "would place an entirely 
undue emphasis on what is ordinarily purely a matter of choice of forms"). 
31 While the negative of an existential is a universal and the negative of a univer-
sal is an existential, an existential does not have an equivalent that is universal in 
form nor does a universal have an equivalent that is existential in form. 
32 Pleadings may be worded so as to mask the nature of an averment, but proper 
structural analysis will yield a unique form that is correctly quantified. 
33 See, e.g., infra note 65. 
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The various treatments of the supposed difficulty are difficult to 
reconcile with the general acceptance attributed it. When the 
cases are examined for the presence of universally quantified 
propositions, a consistency in the court decisions emerges. 
Recent reference to the difficulty in proving a negative is 
found in Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization v. FLRA.35 
The District of Columbia Circuit decided that the Professional 
Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) was required, 
under § 7116(b )(7)(B) of the Civil Service Reform Act,36 "to pro-
duce evidence that it attempted to prevent or stop a strike. Were 
the section interpreted differently, it would require the [FLRA] to 
prove a negative .... "37 The court's statutory interpretation is 
consistent not only with the assumed difficulty in proving a nega-
tive but also, more importantly, with a rule based on the presence 
of a universal quantifier. In PATCO, the union was asked to 
prove that there exists an act such that the act was performed by 
the union and was an attempt to prevent or stop a strike. Placing 
the burden of producing evidence on the FLRA would have re-
quired the agency to establish that each and every act of the 
union was not an attempt to prevent or stop a strike.38 Placing 
the burden on PATCO required it to establish an existential 
proposition, whereas if the burden was on the FLRA, it would 
have had to have established a universal proposition. The diffi-
cult burden that would have been placed on the FLRA justifies 
the court's decision. 
Similarly, in Williams v. Frank,39 the Illinois appellate court 
determined that although the plaintiffs had raised the issue of 
non-provocation in their complaint, it would not automatically 
require them to prove non-provocation at trial. The court noted 
that "[i]t has long been established that a party is not required to 
prove a negative averment, the burden of proof being on the 
party who asserts the affirmative."40 Again, the allocation of the 
burden by the Williams court corresponds not only with a belief 
that negatives are difficult to prove but also with the quantifier-
based analysis. The defendant, under the court's ruling, simply 
34 See supra note 3. 
35 685 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
36 5 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980). 
37 PATCO, 685 F.2d at 577 n.65. 
38 The negation of "there exists an act X such that P" is "for each act X, not P." 
See I. COPI, supra note 4, at 345-46. 
39 II Ill. App. 3d 937, 298 N.E.2d 401 (1973). 
40 See id. at 939, 298 N.E.2d at 403. 
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had to prove that there is an act of the plaintiff such that the act 
provoked the defendant. If the burden had been on the plaintiff, 
however, he would have had to have shown for everyone of his 
acts that each act did not provoke the defendant.41 
Another decision of the Illinois appellate court, Shumak v. 
Shumak,42 also involved the issue of the presence or lack of provo-
cation.43 The court in Shumak held that when the negative aver-
ment pleaded by a party is essential to its cause of action "the 
burden is not to be shifted. . . because of the difficulty in prov-
ing a negative."44 The burden of showing non-provocation, how-
ever, was eased. The Shumak court noted that "where a particular 
fact necessary to be proved rests peculiarly within the knowledge 
of one of the parties it is his duty to come forward with the 
proof. "45 The court further observed that plenary proofs of neg-
ative allegations were not required, and that "[i]t is enough that 
he introduces evidence as, in the absence of counter testimony, 
will afford reasonable ground for presuming the allegation is 
true; and when this is done the onus probandi will be thrown on his 
adversary. "46 
The Shumak court rejected the general negation-based rule 
but found the plaintiffs burden sufficiently eased through special 
rules-at least one of which recognizes a difficulty inherent in the 
proof of a negative-· to uphold the lower court's finding of non-
provocation.47 Yet Shumak falls within the quantification-based 
rule without resort to special adaptation. To show non-provoca-
tion, the plaintiff would be required to prove a universal proposi-
tion. The difficulty inherent in doing so may, under the rule, 
41 See, e.g., Levine v. Pascal, 94 Ill. App. 2d 43,236 N.E.2d 425 (1968). In Levine, 
the negation-based rule was used to place the burden on the party asserting the 
affirmative. Id. at 55, 298 N.E.2d at 431. The issue was knowledge vel non of a 
secured interest. See id. In terms of events providing actual or constructive knowl-
edge, the party claiming that there was knowledge had to prove the existence of 
one such event. The opposing party would have had to have shown that any event 
that occurred did not provide knowledge. The quantification-based analysis would 
yield the same result. 
42 30 Ill. App. 3d 188, 332 N.E.2d 177 (1975). 
43 ld. The issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in granting the plain-
tiff a divorce based on the sufficiency of the evidence establishing lack of provoca-
tion with regard to the alleged mental cruelty of the husband. Id. at 190, 332 
N.E.2d at 179-80. 
44 ld. 
45 Id. at 190-91,332 N.E.2d at 180. 
46 Id. at 190, 332 N.E.2d at 179-80. 
47 See id. The Shumack court noted that where a party fails to produce evidence 
of facts peculiarly within its knowledge, "an inference or presumption is raised that 
the evidence, if produced, would be unfavorable to his cause." !d. 
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require that the burden shift. The court's "peculiarly within the 
knowledge" language is also consistent with the quantification-
based rule. A party seeking proof of an existential proposition is 
more likely to have peculiar knowledge of the event proposed by 
the statement-in this case the act or incident constituting provo-
cation-than would a party asserting a universal would have 
knowledge of every event occurring within the universe of 
discourse.48 
In Snyder v. Wessner,49 the United States District Court for the 
District of Minnesota rejected the defendant's contention that, 
since the defense required proof of a negative, only a minimum 
showing was required to shift a particular burden to the plain-
tiff. 50 As in Shuman, the court's rejection of the negation-based 
rule was based on limiting the rule to cases "where the means of 
disproving the negative are in the possession of the opposite 
party."51 Again, a rule based on universal propositions would 
not require such an exception, but the reason for applying the 
rule would differ from that in Shuman. The plaintiff would have 
to show that he worked more than some fixed number of hours. 
The defendant would have to show that the plaintiff did not work 
that many hours. Since neither proposition is universally quanti-
fied,52 logical form does not add to the difficulty of proving either 
claim and should have no effect on the allocation of burdens. 
The Maryland appellate court, in Daniels v. Superintendent,53 
chose to reject the proof of negative rule rather than cite an ex-
ception.54 The court held that "[t]he pleadings ... provide the 
common guide for apportioning the burden of proof. . . even 
though one has the burden of proving a negative fact as part of 
his cause of action. "55 The perceived lack of justification for 
shifting the burden of proving the issue in dispute (whether the 
plaintiff, held in the state hospital, was still insane56) was a likely 
48 See also In re Chicago Rys., 175 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1949). The same analysis 
and special rules were employed in Chicago Rys., where the issue was the existence 
vel non of notice, to reach a result similar to that of Shumak. See id. at 289-90. 
49 55 F. Supp. 971 (D. Minn. 1944). 
50 Id. at 975. 
51 Id.; see also United States v. Denver & R.C.R.R., 191 U.S. 84 (1903). 
52 Both proofs would be of existential propositions. The plaintifIs averment 
would be that there exists a fixed number of hours worked by the plaintiff, whereas 
the defendants must simply show that there exists a fixed number of hours worked 
that is less than plaintifIs allegation. 
53 34 Md. App. 173, 366 A.2d 1064 (1976). 
54 See id. at 180-81,366 A.2d at 1069. 
55 Id. (citation omitted). 
56 See id. at 175-81,366 A.2d at 1066-69. 
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catalyst for rejecting the negation rule. The quantification-based 
rule, however, need not be abandoned to account for the ration-
ale of the court. Since the proposition in question (the plaintiff's 
sanity) is unquantified, the negative is logically no more difficult 
to prove than the affirmative. Hence, there is no reason to shift 
or modify the burden of proof. 
The Eighth Circuit, in New York Life Insurance Co. v. Stoner,57 
relied on an exception to the negation-based rule in allocating a 
particular burden of proof.58 The circuit court noted that, where 
an affirmative case required proof of a negative, the burden was 
on the party making the negative allegation, " 'especially where 
the most appropriate mode of proof is by establishing the affirm-
ative opposite of the allegation.' "59 This somewhat cryptic justi-
fication indicates an awareness that although the plaintiff was 
required "to show that the defendant was not totally disabled,"60 
such a burden calls only for proof that there exists a job that the 
defendant could do. The plaintiff must establish an existential. 
This is easier than if a universal required proof-that for each 
and every job the defendant is incapable of doing that job-and 
any difficulty arising from this logical form is to be faced by the 
defendant.61 
In Barrett v. Otis Elevator Co. ,62 the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court came close to recognizing the factor that is of real concern 
in placing the burden in disability cases. "If for no other reason 
than the quantity of evidence, it certainly is more difficult to 
prove conclusively that no jobs are available [to a disabled plaintiff] 
than to prove conclusively that ajob is available .... "63 Although 
the court acknowledged that proof of the negative proposition 
(no available job) even by a preponderance of the evidence was 
not odious, it nonetheless placed the burden on the defendant 
employer to show the availability of work.64 The Barrett court 
seems to have inarticulately recognized that universal quantifica-
tion is the source of the difficulty in proof. While it did not find 
57 109 F.2d 874 (8th Cir. 1940). 
58 Id. at 878. 
59 Id. at 876 (quotation omitted). 
60 [d.; see also Bumble Bee Seafoods v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensa-
tion Programs, United States Dep't of Labor, 629 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1980). 
61 See Erler v. Five Points Motors, 57 Cal. Rptr. 516, 249 Cal. App. 2d 560 
(1967) (burden on defendant to show plaintiff could have taken employment to 
mitigate damages). 
62 431 Pa. 446, 246 A.2d 668 (1968). 
63 [d. at 455-56, 246 A.2d at 673 (emphasis in original). 
64 [d. at 456, 246 A.2d at 673. 
HeinOnline -- 15 Seton Hall L. Rev. 288 1984-1985
288 SETON HALL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 15:276 
the difficulty particularly acute, the Barrett court nevertheless 
placed the burden on the party faced with proving the existential 
averment. 
Reconciling the case with the burden-placing rule based on 
the supposed difficulty in proving a negative has required adop-
tion of a complicated procedure to determine burdens.65 The va-
riety of approaches, together with their increased complexity, 
indicates the need for a logically consistent unifying principle. 
The recognition that it is the existence of a universal quantifier 
rather than negative form that makes proof difficult fulfills that 
need. Even in situations that have led courts to reject the nega-
tion-based rule, the universal quantification-based rule may still 
be applicable. 
III. CONCLUSION 
There is no difficulty inherent in proof of negative proposi-
tions, despite persistent claims to the contrary. It is, however, 
more difficult to prove a universally quantified statement than it 
is to prove one that is existentially quantified. Since the negation 
of an existential is a universal, negation may appear to make 
proof more difficult, but that is so only when it is an existential 
that is negated. 
The folklore that a negative proposition is difficult to prove 
should be rejected. The logically based principle that should be 
understood and accepted is that there is difficulty in proving a 
universal, and any deference formerly afforded to parties faced 
with proving a negative should be granted instead to parties 
faced with the task of proving a universal. This change would do 
more than clarify the language of the case law. It would also rec-
oncile cases that could not otherwise be reconciled without diffi-
culty and without adoption of special rules. The change would 
65 The procedure was enunciated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Den-
ver & R.G.R.R., 191 U.S. 84 (1903), in which the Court noted: 
When a negative is averred in pleading, or a plaintiffs case depends 
upon the establishment of a negative, and the means of proving the fact 
are equally within the control of each party, then the burden of proof is 
on the party averring the negative; but when the opposite party must, 
from the nature of the case, himself be in possession of full and plenary 
proof to disprove the negative averment, and the other party is not in 
possession of such proof, then it is manifestly just and reasonable that 
the party which is in possession of the proof should be required to ad-
duce it; or, upon his failure to do so, we must presume it does not exist, 
which of itself establishes a negative. 
/d. at 92. 
HeinOnline -- 15 Seton Hall L. Rev. 289 1984-1985
1985] MYTHIC DIFFICULTY 289 
also lessen the likelihood that a proposition appearing difficult 
under a negation-based rule, but in fact no more difficult than its 
opposite affirmative proposition, will unjustly afford its propo-
nent the benefits of whatever burden-modifying principle is auto-
matically but erroneously implied because of the form of the 
averment. 
